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COMMENTS
STRUCTURING DETERMINATE SENTENCING
GUIDELINES: DIFFICULT CHOICES FOR
THE NEW FEDERAL
SENTENCING COMMISSION
The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984' has ushered in a wave of
changes to existing federal criminal law2 that constitutes the most sweeping
1. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2200 (1984)
reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (98 Stat.) 2. Enactment of the Comprehen-
sive Crime Control Act of 1984 is the culmination of a more than decade-long bipartisan effort
by Congress, with the cooperation of successive administrations, to overhaul and recodify the
federal criminal code. The new law incorporates significant changes in the areas of sentencing,
bail reform, criminal forfeiture, drug trafficking, and computer fraud. Other highlights of the
Act include the establishment of a fund to compensate victims of violent crime and a substan-
tial revision of the insanity defense, which includes shifting the burden of proof from the prose-
cutor to the defendant when the insanity defense is raised. The Act also encompasses
substantive revisions to several federal statutes relating to the commission of violent and nonvi-
olent serious offenses. Finally, the statute includes a number of procedural amendments to the
criminal code to improve the operation of the criminal justice system. See S. REP. No. 225,
98th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3182 [hereinafter
cited as S. REP. No. 225].
Although the Act makes some far-reaching changes and improvements to existing federal
criminal statutes, it has been criticized for failing to provide the comprehensive reform that
Congress set out to achieve when it undertook the code reform initiative more than a decade
ago. This criticism points out that the new law has adopted a "piecemeal" approach to code
reform and, in this respect, has fallen short of providing a uniform and systematic restructur-
ing of the federal criminal law. See Feinberg, Introduction to Symposium on the Crime Control
Act of 1984, 22 AM. CRIM. L. REV. xi, xi-xii (1985). For a review of earlier criminal code
reform legislative initiatives, see S.REP. No. 553, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). See also Reform
of the Federal Criminal Laws: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Proce-
dures of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 92d-95th Cong. pts. I-XIII (1971-1977).
2. See diGenova & Belfiore, An Overview of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of
1984-The Prosecutor's Perspective, 22 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 707 (1985) (providing brief sum-
maries of the key provisions in Chapters I through XV of the Act).
The major highlights of the Act include stricter bail requirements which incorporate
considerations of 'dangerousness' into pretrial detention decisions; sentencing reform
which includes a determinate sentencing system, enhanced penalties, and an end to
parole; new provisions giving federal prosecutors authority to seize the assets and
profits of drug traffickers; new laws prohibiting tampering with computers, unauthor-
ized use of credit cards and bank-access numbers, and trafficking in counterfeit trade-
marked goods; an overhaul of the insanity defense which includes placing the burden
of proof on the defendant in subsequent commitment procedures; and the establish-
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reform movement in the history of the criminal justice system.3 The corner-
stone of the Act4 and the most far-reaching proposal it contains is federal
sentencing reform.5 In brief, the new sentencing provisions will limit judi-
cial discretion in sentencing, phase out parole, and abolish current indeter-
minate sentencing procedures6 that have caused wide disparity in the prison
terms handed out to similarly situated offenders convicted of relatively simi-
lar crimes.7 Under the new law, these practices will be replaced with deter-
minate sentencing guidelines fashioned by an independent Sentencing
Commission.' The guidelines, once developed by the Commission, will dic-
tate relatively fixed terms of imprisonment to be imposed by federal judges
on the basis of the seriousness of the crime committed and the criminal his-
tory of the convicted offender. 9
In proposing this shift to a determinate sentencing system, Congress ac-
knowledged that the rehabilitation theory underlying the current indetermi-
nate system simply had not worked. " Nor, Congress concluded, is
rehabilitation "an appropriate basis for sentencing decisions."" The broad
discretion exercised by federal judges in sentencing convicted offenders
under an indeterminate system has created wide disparity in sentences 12 and
ment of a Crime Victims' Fund, financed by criminal fines and forfeitures, to com-
pensate victims of federal and state crimes through direct and indirect grant
programs.
Id. at 707-08 (footnotes omitted).
3. Feinberg, supra note 1, at xi.
4. See Rodino, Federal Criminal Sentencing Reform, 11 J. LEGIS. 218, 218 (1984) ("Sen-
tencing is the cornerstone of any criminal justice system.").
5. Kennedy, Foreward to Symposium on the Crime Control Act of 1984, 22 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. vii, ix (1985).
6. Under an indeterminate sentencing system the courts and parole boards are afforded
wide discretion in setting prison terms within the minimum and maximum statutorily man-
dated sentence range for the commission of a particular offense. The actual length of the
prison term to be served is thus indeterminate at the time of sentencing and remains unknown
to the defendant until the parole board authorizes his release. 1 NATIONAL ACADEMY OF
SCIENCES PANEL ON SENTENCING RESEARCH, RESEARCH ON SENTENCING: THE SEARCH
FOR REFORM 126 (A. Blumstein, J. Cohen, S. Martin & M. Tonry, eds., 1983). A determinate
sentencing system, by comparison, limits judicial and parole board discretion in sentencing by
setting fixed, or established sentences within a limited sentencing range. Under determinate
sentencing, the sentence is determined, or known to the defendant, at the time the judge an-
nounces the sentence. The release date is not determined at a later time by a parole-type
agency. Id. at 133.
7. See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 1, at 37-50.
8. 28 U.S.C.A. § 994 (West Supp. 1985). See also S. REP. No. 225, supra note 1, at 163-
81.
9. 28 U.S.C.A. § 994 (c), (d) (West Supp. 1985).
10. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 1, at 40 n.16.
11. Id.
12. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 1, at 41-46.
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made a mockery of "individualization" in sentencing by imposing prison
terms that were "more dependent on the judge than the offense or the of-
fender.''" By contrast, presumptive sentencing guidelines, while not a pan-
acea for inconsistency in sentencing, would provide judges with standard
criteria to apply in formulating sentencing decisions and, hopefully, insure
greater uniformity, fairness, and certainty in federal sentencing practices."4
While Congress has made clear that an overriding purpose of federal sen-
tencing reform will be the reduction of disparity in sentencing practices, 5
this goal is to be realized at a time of increasing public demand for the impo-
sition of more stringent penal sanctions as an antidote to "the war on
crime."' 6 This has led to serious concern and speculation that sentencing
reform will become synonymous with longer prison terms and increased
prison overcrowding.' 7 If this outcome is to be avoided, the Sentencing
Commission will need to weigh carefully the impact of sentencing reform on
prison population.18 The Commission cannot focus solely on philosophical
concerns nor should its sentencing recommendations be swayed by anti-
crime sentiments. '9 Thus, an important function of the Commission will be
to produce guidelines that are realistic and workable, as well as fair to both
the offender and society.
Although the new federal sentencing reforms have been characterized as
revolutionary,2° the concept of a determinate sentencing scheme embodied
The absence of a comprehensive Federal sentencing law and of statutory guidance on
how to select the appropriate sentencing option creates inevitable disparity in the
sentences which courts impose on similarly situated defendants. This occurs in
sentences handed down by judges in the same district and by judges from different
districts and circuits in the Federal system. One judge may impose a relatively long
prison term to rehabilitate or incapacitate the offender. Another judge, under similar
circumstances, may sentence the defendant to a shorter prison term simply to punish
him, or the judge may opt for the imposition of a term of probation in order to
rehabilitate him.
Id. at 41 (footnotes omitted).
13. Frankel & Orland, Sentencing Commissions and Guidelines, 73 GEo. L.J. 225, 226
(1984).
14. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 1, at 65.
15. See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 1, at 39.
16. Frankel & Orland, supra note 13, at 232-33.
17. Id. at 233.
18. See generally Blumstein, Sentencing Reforms: Impacts and Implications, 68 JUDICA-
TURE 129 (1984) (advocating analysis of the impact of a determinate sentencing policy on
prison population).
19. Id.
20. Rezneck, The New Federal Criminal Sentencing Provisions, 22 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
785, 785 (1985). "The sentencing provisions of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984
are intended to reform federal sentencing practices and procedures. Their likely effect, how-
1985]
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in the Act was developed more than a decade ago.21 Indeed, Senator
Edward Kennedy shaped these concepts into statutory form and offered the
first legislative prescription for a presumptive sentencing model in 1977.22
The new federal sentencing law also follows in the wake of a variety of
sentencing reform movements undertaken by several state legislatures in re-
cent years23 and, in many respects, parallels the determinate sentencing
guidelines system adopted by Minnesota in 1980.24 The federal sentencing
provisions are also similar to the determinate sentencing guidelines initiative
developed by New York shortly after the enactment of the federal statute.25
The sentencing guidelines commissions in Minnesota and New York have
already paved the way for a federal counterpart in developing a workable
determinate sentencing formula. In many respects, their efforts will provide
a clear blueprint for the federal Commission to follow in the architecture of
its own sentencing guidelines model. Their experience, however, suggests
this will be a formidable task and that there will be no easy solutions to some
ever, will not be to reform criminal sentencing, but to revolutionalize it." Id. (footnotes
omitted).
21. See generally M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER (1972).
This work provides a rationale, as well as a general formula, for the structuring of an in-
dependent federal sentencing commission. The author proposes the creation by Congress of a
"Commission on Sentencing" as a permanent agency with responsibility for "(1) the study of
sentencing, corrections, and parole; (2) the formulation of laws and rules to which the studies
pointed; and (3) the actual enactment of rules, subject to traditional checks by Congress and
the courts." Id. at 119 (emphasis in original). The proposal envisions a division of lawmaking
functions between Congress and the proposed commission. While Congress would reserve for
itself the authority to determine the purposes of sanctions, the basic types of treatment and
punishment facilities and the sentence ranges for specified offenses, the commission would pre-
scribe rules of general applicability regarding the factors to be considered in individual
sentences, the weight to be accorded to these factors, and the details of sentencing and parole
procedures. Id. at 122-23.
22. S. 1437, 95th Cong. 1st, Sess., 123 CONG. REC. 13,066 (1977). S. 1437 was the first in
a series of sentencing reform measures introduced by Senator Kennedy between 1977 and
1984. Although the sentencing provisions incorporated in S. 1437 were further refined by the
Senate during its consideration of subsequent sentencing proposals, the sentencing provisions
contained in S. 1437 are, for the most part, carried forward in the Comprehensive Crime Con-
trol Act of 1984. See also S. REP. No. 225, supra note 1, at 37.
23. For a brief overview of recent state sentencing reform initiatives, see S. REP. No. 225,
supra note 1, at 61-62 nn. 111-20. For a more detailed analysis and summary of state and local
legislative efforts to reform current sentencing practices, see generally NATIONAL ACADEMY
OF SCIENCES PANEL ON SENTENCING RESEARCH, RESEARCH ON SENTENCING: THE
SEARCH FOR REFORM, supra note 6.
24. MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMMISSION, THE IMPACT OF THE MINNE-
SOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES: THREE YEAR EVALUATION (Sept. 1984) [hereinafter cited
as MINN. IMPACT REP.].
25. NEW YORK STATE COMMITTEE ON SENTENCING GUIDELINES, DETERMINATE SEN-
TENCING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (March 1985) [hereinafter cited as N.Y. DETER-
MINATE SENTENCING REP.].
[Vol. 35:181
Structuring Determinate Sentencing Guidelines
of the complex and controversial issues that will confront the federal
Commission.
Since the inception of federal sentencing reform legislation, concern has
been expressed that sentencing guidelines will lead to prison overcrowding,
that the duration of sentences will be either too long or not long enough, and
that guidelines will result in a shift in sentencing discretion from judges to
prosecutors.26 Concern has also been raised over the impact on sentencing
guidelines of imposing sentences to concurrent or consecutive terms of im-
prisonment for the commission of multiple offenses.27
This Comment will discuss how the Minnesota and New York sentencing
guidelines commissions resolved these particular concerns, the rationale be-
hind their decisions, and whether their solutions should influence the delib-
erations of the federal Sentencing Commission in structuring its own
determinate sentencing guidelines model. Although these concerns do not
represent a comprehensive list of the many issues the federal Commission
will need to address in formulating its guidelines model, they are illustrative
of the more controversial issues the Commission will confront. Moreover,
the success of the guidelines may well hinge on how the Sentencing Commis-
sion ultimately chooses to resolve these critical problems.
I. THE LEGISLATIVE MANDATE
The overall goal of the sentencing provisions of the federal Act is the crea-
tion, for the first time in the history of the federal criminal justice system, of
a comprehensive sentencing policy.28 The statute identifies the basic pur-
poses of sentencing as retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilita-
tion.29 It also empowers an independent Commission with broad authority
to translate these objectives into a uniform sentencing plan to guide federal
judges in their sentencing decisions.3° The Commission is to be composed of
seven voting members and one nonvoting member to be appointed by the
President with the approval of the Senate." Voting members will be ap-
26. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 1, at 60. The Senate Report notes two additional con-
cerns that have been raised regarding sentencing guidelines. These include that the guidelines
will invest too much power in the Sentencing Commission and that the authority conferred on
the Department of Justice to appeal a sentencing recommendation below the guidelines is inap-
propriate. Id.
27. Feinberg, Law With Order: The New Federal Sentencing Commission, Boston Globe,
Dec. 1, 1985, at 22, col. 1.
28. E.g., S. REP. No. 225, supra note 1, at 37.
29. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a)(2) (West 1985).
30. 28 U.S.C.A. § 994(a) (West Supp. 1985).
31. Id. § 99 1(a). Nearly one year after the enactment of the Comprehensive Crime Con-
trol Act of 1984, the President announced the seven nominees that had been selected to serve
1985]
Catholic University Law Review
pointed for six-year terms and be limited to no more than two terms of ser-
vice on the Commission.32 At least three Commission members are to be
federal judges and no more than four may be from the same political party.33
The Commission is assigned two primary duties. The first is to promul-
gate sentencing guidelines for the federal courts to follow in making determi-
nations as to the type and length of sentences to be imposed in criminal
cases.34 Such determinations are to encompass recommendations as to
whether to impose a sentence of probation, a fine, or imprisonment.35 In
imposing terms of imprisonment, the guidelines must also specify whether
multiple sentences should be ordered to run concurrently or consecutively.
36
The Commission's second, and related, duty is to issue general policy
statements concerning the application of the guidelines and any other as-
pects of sentencing and sentence implementation that would further the pur-
poses of sentencing, as defined by the statute.37 These policy statements
must address, but are not limited to, provisions in the sentencing statute
relating to sanctions, probation and supervised release, sentence modifica-
tions, plea bargaining, temporary release, and prerelease custody.35
The sentence ranges proposed under the guidelines are to be based on a
combination of factors characteristic of the offense
39 and of the offender.40
on the first Sentencing Commission. Nominations Submitted to the Senate, 21 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 1085 (Sept. 16, 1985). The nominees were subsequently approved by the
Senate. 131 CONG. REC. S13,376-77 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 1985).
32. 28 U.S.C.A. § 992(a), (b) (West Supp. 1985). The initial terms of the first members of
the Commission shall be staggered with one member and the Chairman serving terms of six
years, three members serving terms of four years, and two members serving terms of two years.
Id.
33. 28 U.S.C.A. § 991(a) (West Supp. 1985).
34. Id. § 994(a)(1).
35. Id. § 994(a)(1)(A).
36. Id. § 994(a)(l)(D).
37. Id. § 994(a)(2).
38. Id. § 994(a)(2)(A)-(E).
39. Id. § 994(c). This provision sets out several factors relevant to the offense committed
that the Sentencing Commission is to examine in determining the appropriate sanction to be
imposed under the guidelines. The Commission is directed to take these factors into account
only to the extent that they have relevance in determining an appropriate sentence. The stat-
ute recommends the following offense characteristics be considered by the Commission in for-
mulating sentencing guidelines:
(1) the grade of the offense; (2) the circumstances under which the offense was com-
mitted which mitigate or aggravate the seriousness of the offense; (3) the nature and
degree of harm caused by the offense, including whether it involved property, irre-
placeable property, a person, a number of persons, or a breach of public trust; (4) the
community view of the gravity of the offense; (5) the public concern generated by the
offense; (6) the deterrent effect a particular sentence may have on the commission of
the offense by others; and (7) the current incidence of the offense in the community
and in the Nation as a whole.
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While the statute directs the Commission to examine the relevance of several
factors in determining the categories of recommended sentences, the Com-
mission is given considerable leeway to select those offenses or offender char-
acteristics that it considers most pertinent in setting an appropriate
sentencing range.4" The guidelines, however, are to remain entirely neutral
with regard to offender status factors such as race, sex, national origin,
creed, and socioeconomic rank.42
The statute provides the Commission with one important caveat in formu-
lating its initial set of sentencing guidelines: it cautions the Commission that
current sentences do not accurately reflect the seriousness of offenses.43 The
statute, therefore, recommends that an appropriate starting point for the
Commission in formulating its guidelines would be to ascertain the average
length of sentences currently imposed and the length of prison terms actu-
ally served under the existing sentencing system." The Commission, how-
ever, need not be bound by these findings and is free to develop its own
sentence ranges, provided they are consistent with the sentencing purposes
45of the statute.
The sentence range imposed for each category of offense and offender is
subject to a twenty-five percent limitation on the difference between the max-
imum and minimum terms of imprisonment recommended under the guide-
lines.46 The guidelines are to specify sentence lengths at or near the
maximum terms of imprisonment for defendants who commit a violent
crime or have a record of prior felony convictions.47 The guidelines should
also reflect the appropriateness of imposing a sentence alternative to impris-
Id.
40. Id. § 994(d). Several factors characteristic of the offender are to be weighed by the
Commission in setting sentencing guidelines. Offender characteristics, like offense factors, are
to be considered by the Commission only to the extent that they are relevant in determining
the appropriate sentence to be imposed. The statute recommends the following offender char-
acteristics be considered by the Commission in formulating sentencing guidelines:
(1) age; (2) education; (3) vocational skills; (4) mental and emotional condition to the
extent that such condition mitigates the defendant's culpability or to the extent that
such condition is otherwise plainly relevant; (5) physical condition, including drug
dependence; (6) previous employment record; (7) family ties and responsibilities; (8)
community ties; (9) role in the offense; (10) criminal history; and (11) degree of de-
pendence upon criminal activity for a livelihood.
Id.
41. Id. § 994.
42. Id.
43. Id. § 994(m).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. § 994(b).
47. Id. § 994(h).
1985]
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onment upon defendants who are first offenders or are convicted of nonvio-
lent crimes.4" Sentences imposed under the guidelines may be appealed by
the defendant if the sentence duration exceeds the maximum range desig-
nated for that particular category of offense and offender.4 9 Sentences that
fall below the specified guidelines range are appealable by the government.5
In prescribing presumptive sentence ranges, the Commission is to take
into account the impact of the guidelines on the federal prison system.5 The
Commission may make recommendations regarding any change in, or ex-
pansion of, existing prison facilities and should strive to minimize the likeli-
hood that the prison population will exceed federal prison capacity.52
The initial set of guidelines promulgated by the Commission and an ac-
companying report are to be submitted to Congress within eighteen months
of the enactment of the statute.53 They will become effective within six
months unless Congress acts to prevent their implementation.5 4 Once the
initial set of guidelines has been promulgated, the Commission will monitor
their implementation and submit annual reports to Congress commenting on
the operation of the guidelines and recommending any revisions that appear
to be warranted.55
II. COORDINATION OF SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONAL POLICIES
Prison overcrowding has been identified as the number one problem con-
fronting correctional institutions today.5 6 The federal prison system is no
exception to this disturbing fact.5 7 The total population of federal inmates
presently exceeds the total rated prison capacity by over thirty-two per-
48. Id. § 9940).
49. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3742(a) (West 1985).
50. Id. § 3742(b).
51. 28 U.S.C.A. § 994(g) (West Supp. 1985).
52. Id.
53. Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 235(a)(l)(B)(i), 98 Stat. 1837, 2031 (1984). Under this provi-
sion, the Sentencing Commission was to issue its final report to Congress by April 13, 1986. In
light of the fact that Commission members did not officially convene until late 1985, it would
have been difficult, if not impossible to meet the statutorily mandated deadline. See N.Y.
Times, Sept. 11, 1985, at A21, col. I (statement of Judge William W. Wilkins, Jr., Chairman
of the Sentencing Commission, commenting on the difficulty for the Commission to issue its
final report by April 1986). Congress thus voted to extend the deadline for submission of the
Commission's report for one year or until April 13, 1987. Sentencing Reform Amendments
Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-217.
54. Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 235(a)(1)(B)(ii), 98 Stat. 1837, 2031-32 (1984).
55. 28 U.S.C.A. § 994(n) (West Supp. 1985).
56. Armstrong, Prudent Use of Prison Space: The Sentencing Improvement Act, 11 J.
LEGIs. 237, 238 (1984).
57. Id. at 239.
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cent.58 This statistic is even more alarming when translated into actual dol-
lar figures. Merely keeping pace with the current rate of increase in prison
populations would require annual outlays in prison construction budgets of
nearly $180 billion. 59 Construction costs, however, only represent the initial
expense.' Operational costs, coupled with the hidden costs of lost employ-
ment taxes and welfare payments to prisoners' families, further inflate the
expense to society of burgeoning prison rolls.
6 1
While there is a growing trend today toward imposing harsher punish-
ments to combat crime, 62 the extent to which society and legislatures are
willing to support this trend through increased expenditures for the con-
struction and operation of prisons remains uncertain. This is precisely the
dilemma confronting the federal Sentencing Commission. The Commission
could propose stiffer sentencing penalties and recommend an accompanying
expansion of existing correctional facilities. 63 The authority to implement
this change, however, rests with Congress. On the one hand, if the Commis-
sion prescribes sentence ranges that would lead to an increase in prison
populations, the guidelines could be undermined or circumvented without
the accompanying fiscal support of Congress.6' On the other hand, if the
58. United States Department of Justice Federal Prison System, Bureau of Prisons Multi-
Year Plan 1 (Feb. 1985). Bureau of Prisons statistics show a dramatic 37% increase in the
federal prison population between January 1981 and February 1985. The Bureau attributes
this rise in the federal inmate population to recent law enforcement initiatives undertaken by
the present Administration emphasizing drug trafficking and organized crime. On the basis of
these recent inmate population trends, the Bureau projects further population increases
through 1986. In addition, the Bureau predicts this rise will continue as a result of provisions
in the Comprehensive Crime Control Act that create several federal offenses in the areas of
drug trafficking, violent crime, terrorism, and computer fraud, as well as minimum mandatory
sentences for repeat offenders and for offenders who use a firearm in the commission of a
violent felony. Moreover, the Bureau suggests there will be a significant impact on its resource
requirements as a result of the elimination of parole and the establishment of sentencing guide-
lines by the new federal Sentencing Commission. Id. at 2-3.
59. Armstrong, supra note 56, at 239.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 239-40.
62. Frankel & Orland, supra note 13, at 232.
63. See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 1, at 175. In formulating sentencing guidelines, the
Commission is to keep in mind the available capacity of existing correctional facilities. The
intent of this directive is not to limit the Commission's authority in recommending guidelines
that it believes will best serve the purposes of sentencing. Rather, the intent is that the Com-
mission be aware of prison capacity so that it is not inadvertently exceeded. Thus, the Com-
mission may recommend changes in prison capacity that it considers necessary in light of its
proposed guidelines. Id.
64. von Hirsch, Constructing Guidelines for Sentencing.: The Critical Choices for the Min-
nesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission, 5 HAMLINE L. REV. 164, 177 (1984). The author
points out in this article that the tension that would arise from a further increase in the existing
strain on prison capacity without an accompanying expansion in correctional facilities would
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guidelines propose lenient sentences that would be inadequate in meeting the
defined purposes of sentencing, the Commission runs the risk that the pro-
posed guidelines will be rejected by Congress.
65
To alleviate the potentially adverse impact of presumptive sentencing
guidelines on prison capacity, the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Com-
mission applied prison population constraints in developing its guidelines
formula.66 The Commission determined that ninety-five percent of capacity
would be the maximum occupancy rate for its prisons67 and resolved to
structure guidelines that would not exceed this rated capacity. 6 To accom-
plish this, the Commission developed a prison population model that ena-
bled it to assess quantitatively the effect of various sentencing options on
projected prison populations over a five-year period. 69 Thus, Minnesota was
able to modulate its guidelines and produce sentencing recommendations
that would not exceed the rated prison capacity.7 °
inevitably force correctional authorities or the courts to take some corrective action to alleviate
the problem of overcrowding. Id. at 177. The likely result would be either discretionary re-
lease of prisoners by corrections boards or mandatory reductions in prison population by the
courts. Id. Either action would lead to an erosion of the guidelines and a diminishing of the
Commission's influence over the time offenders would actually serve in prison. Id.
65. Id. at 178. "The pressures to adopt stances of symbolic toughness are strong and will
be felt by any rulemaker." Id. To illustrate this point, the author refers to the recent experi-
ence of the Pennsylvania Sentencing Commission that encountered difficulties in defending its
guidelines proposal against demands for tougher penalties. The state legislature ultimately
rejected the proposed guidelines on the basis that they were not stringent enough. Id.
66. See MINN. IMPACT REP., supra note 24, at 87-96. See also von Hirsch, supra note 64,
at 176.
The legislature, in the enabling statute, has called upon the Commission to take cor-
rectional resources, including prison capacities, "into consideration." The statute
did not, however, specify what role or weight should be given this factor. The Com-
mission thus had the choice of either adopting a firm population constraint, or of
merely taking prison populations into account as one among other considerations in
fashioning the Guidelines' overall severity levels. It was the Commission which de-
cided, as a matter of policy, to adopt the firm constraint.
Id.
67. Frankel & Orland, supra note 13, at 239.
68. von Hirsch, supra note 64, at 176. The Minnesota Commission's legislative mandate
directed that state correctional resources including prison capacities be taken "into considera-
tion" in developing sentencing guidelines. Id. Thus, the Commission was free to determine
whether prison population would be one of several factors to be considered in determining the
severity level of sentences under the guidelines or whether prison capacities should be a pri-
mary concern and thereby dictate the severity of the recommended sentencing ranges. Id.
Minnesota chose to adopt prison population constraint. Id. In developing its guideline model,
the Commission adjusted sentencing ranges so as to produce a sentencing scheme that would
not exceed the rated capacity of the prison population. Id.
69. See MINN. IMPACT REP., supra note 24, at 87-96. See also Frankel & Orland, supra
note 13, at 239 n.80.
70. See MINN. IMPACT REP., supra note 24, at 87-96.
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The prison population constraint model produced by the Minnesota Com-
mission has been successful in maintaining the prison population within the
state's rated prison capacity7 1 and deemed worthy of emulation by other
sentencing commissions.7 2 The Minnesota Commission reports that despite
early predictions that sentencing practices under the guidelines would lead
to prison overcrowding, the Commission, working in conjunction with the
legislature, has managed "to avert the projected crisis in prison popula-
tions.",7 3 Moreover, prison population constraint has been instrumental in
coordinating sentencing policy with correctional resources7 4 and has in-
creased the recognition of prisons as a scarce resource.7 5
In contrast to Minnesota, the New York Sentencing Guidelines Commit-
tee did not interpret its legislative mandate as a directive that proposed
sentences conform to currently planned prison capacity.7 6 The Committee
71. See generally id. at 87-96. During the first three years of operation under the guide-
lines, the prison population in Minnesota has been maintained within the capacity of the state's
correctional facilities. Id. The Commission predicts that populations will continue to stay
within the program's capacity for at least the immediate future. Id. at 96.
72. Frankel & Orland, supra note 13, at 239.
73. See Knapp, What Sentencing Reform in Minnesota Has and Has Not Accomplished, 68
JUDICATURE 181 (1984). During 1981, the first year of operation under the guidelines, prison
commitment levels dropped from nearly 100% of capacity to approximately 93% of capacity.
Id. at 188. In 1982, however, commitments increased and returned to the near capacity,
preguidelines level. This rise in commitment levels was attributed to several factors: (1) an
increase in imprisonment of property offenders; (2) changes in plea charging practices; (3) an
increase by the legislature in the mandatory minimum sentence for felonies committed with a
handgun; and (4) a slight increase in the number of offenders moving through the system. Id.
at 187-89. Projections based on sentencing practices in 1982 indicated that if these practices
were to continue prison populations would increase and result in serious overcrowding. Id. at
188. The Commission was determined to avoid this outcome and, working in conjunction with
the legislature, implemented several changes to avert the predicted problem of overcrowding.
First, the legislature made the "good time" statute applicable to the new mandatory minimum
for handgun offenses, thereby reducing the term of imprisonment for the mandatory mini-
mums passed in 1981. Id. Second, the legislature revised the definition of subsequent offense
to restrict its application. Id. Third, reductions in guideline durations were made retroactive
to prison inmates. Id. And, fourth, the Commission modified the guidelines by reducing sen-
tence durations for the least serious property offenses and by providing credit for jail time
served as a condition of probation. Id. See also MINN. IMPACT REP., supra note 24, at 88-96.
74. Knapp, supra note 73, at 189. Cf Frankel & Orland, supra note 13, at 238-39. The
authors note that the general tendency of legislatures is to make a distinction between the
function of judges, which is to order offenders to prison, and the function of correctional insti-
tutions, which is to ensure the availability of prison space to carry out the judgments. Id. at
239. The result has been to separate functions that are intrinsically inseparable. Id.
75. See von Hirsch, supra note 64, at 177-78. See also Frankel & Orland, supra note 13, at
239 ("If Minnesota had attempted nothing more, it would have supplied notable leadership in
recognizing . . . punishment 'is not a cost-free good.' ").
76. N.Y. DETERMINATE SENTENCING REP., supra note 25, at 140. New York's legisla-
tive mandate, like Minnesota's, directed the Commission to take available state correctional
resources into consideration in formulating sentencing guidelines. Act of July 28, 1983, ch.
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reasoned that to do so would result in a recommendation to reduce the use
of incarceration-a recommendation the Committee viewed as a function
properly within the jurisdiction of the legislature." Consequently, the New
York Committee chose to recommend sentences that would place no greater
demand on the state's correctional resources than were present under the
existing determinate sentencing structure.78
The New York Committee developed a sentencing model, on the basis of
several assumptions, 79 which simulated an inmate growth rate over a five-
year period under the proposed guidelines that would be relatively similar to
the growth rate produced by the indeterminate sentencing system. 0 The
Committee recognized an inherent flaw in the proposed simulation in that it
was impossible to assess precisely whether the several assumptions on which
711, 1983 N.Y. Laws § 2.4, reprinted in N.Y. DETERMINATE SENTENCING REP., supra note
25, at 159. This general statutory language left the Commission free to decide whether prison
population should be a controlling factor or merely one of several factors to be considered in
developing a sentencing guideline model. Whereas Minnesota took this language to mean that
sentencing guidelines were not to exceed the state's rated prison capacities, see supra note 68
and accompanying text, New York determined that the capacities of state correctional facili-
ties was one of several factors to be weighed in determining the severity level of the sentences
recommended under the guidelines.
77. Id. The New York Committee viewed its authority as a limited one. It did not inter-
pret its power as extending to the right to recommend a reduction or expansion of the state's
correctional facilities. It saw this as a budgetary function solely within the purview of the state
legislature.
78. Id. Under New York's current indeterminate sentencing system, state correctional
facilities are operating at 110% of capacity. See N.Y. DETERMINATE SENTENCING REP.,
supra note 25, at 134. Assuming court commitments remain constant, the state's prisons
would continue to operate at the same excess rate of capacity under the guidelines. Thus, the
guidelines would place no greater strain on existing correctional resources. If, however, com-
mitment rates were to increase under the guidelines then the rated capacity would similarly
rise, or exceed the 110% of capacity that presently exists. By contrast, the Minnesota Com-
mission determined that commitment levels under its guideline model would not exceed 95%
of capacity. If commitment levels were to increase under the Minnesota guidelines and pro-
duce an accompanying rise in prison capacities, the Commission would revise its sentencing
recommendations so as to maintain the 95% rated capacity. This is precisely what occurred in
Minnesota. When commitment rates began to increase under its guidelines the Commission
modulated them and thus managed to keep the prison population within its rated capacity.
See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
79. Id. at 142. The Committee modeled the impact of the proposed guidelines upon sev-
eral assumptions. The assumptions were as follows: the guidelines took effect on January 1,
1983; the under-custody population would be aged out on the basis of same time served esti-
mates as those used for current law; incoming court commitments would receive sentences at
the midpoint of the proposed sentence range; there would be no departures from the proposed
sentencing ranges; all offenders would accrue three-fourths of the maximum good time allowa-
ble; and, in those cases where the proposed sentence provided for an alternative to imprison-
ment, it was assumed that those cases receiving a non-prison sentence would be proportionate
to the cases that received a non-prison sentence in 1983. Id.
80. N.Y. DETERMINATE SENTENCING REP., supra note 25, at 140-46.
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the model depended would accurately reflect actual sentencing practices by
judges under the guidelines.8" In the absence of any assurance as to how the
new system would operate in practice, the Committee recommended vigor-
ous monitoring of the guidelines and suggested the legislature provide an
early-warning mechanism that would alert policy makers to anticipated in-
creases in the prison population and thereby afford them adequate time to
respond to these changes.8 2 The New York Committee also requested that it
be empowered to implement certain changes to the guidelines subject to a
legislative veto,83 rather than being restricted to propose only legislative al-
ternatives that would be ineffective unless enacted by the state.
84
The problem of prison overcrowding in a determinate sentencing system is
one of two competing interests; scarce prison resources85 are pitted against a
policy that seeks greater protection for society by increasing the severity of
sanctions imposed for criminal behavior.86 Reconciling these goals is a diffi-
cult, if not impossible task. Some trade-offs appear inevitable.
The Minnesota Commission clearly elected to coordinate sentencing poli-
cies with correctional functions and thus modified its sentencing recommen-
dations so as not to exceed the rated capacity of the state's prison
population. The employment of the prison population constraint by Minne-
sota, however, is not surprising in light of the state's long-standing tradition
of moderation in punishment.87 In New York, where sentencing is more
politicized, 8 prison population constraint was unacceptable to a constitu-
ency and legislature that favored stiffer penalties for crime.89 The New York
81. Id. at 145-46.
82. Id. at 146-47.
83. If a legislative veto provision were incorporated in the Committee's statutory man-
date, the Committee could make recommendations to implement changes in the guidelines
that would have the force and effect of law unless expressly vetoed by both houses of the state
legislature. Id. at 146.
84. Id.
85. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
86. See Frankel & Orland, supra note 13, at 232-33.
87. von Hirsch & Hanrahan, Determinate Penalty Systems in America: An Overview, 1981
CRIME AND DELINQ., 289, 308. See also von Hirsch, supra note 64, at 179. Minnesota has
relied upon sentencing sparingly. Id. The state's per capita prison use has been one of the
lowest in the country. Id. The author cautions however, that the use of prison population
constraint does not necessarily guarantee the sparing use of imprisonment.
Only in a state that has hitherto exercised restraint in the construction of prison
space and the use of imprisonment will one get Minnesota's more modest sanction
levels. If the same population constraint were applied in a jurisdiction that has his-
torically been prodigal with imprisonment, it could lead to quite severe overall pun-
ishment levels.
Id.
88. von Hirsch & Hanrahan, supra note 87, at 308.
89. The New York Penal Law is replete with mandatory incarceration requirements.
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Committee, however, was not unmindful of the potential problems that
would arise if inmate commitments exceeded institutional capacity.9° It
therefore recommended close monitoring of the guidelines and implementa-
tion of additional safeguards if it appeared the guidelines would lead to se-
vere overcrowding.9 In this sense, New York developed a somewhat
modified version of prison population constraint by allowing for downward
adjustments in the guidelines if a substantial increase in prison capacity was
certain to occur.
The federal Sentencing Commission, like the commissions in Minnesota
and New York, has received an express directive to consider the impact of
guidelines on the capacity of correctional facilities. 92 Congress made clear,
however, its mandate was not intended to require the Commission to recom-
mend a continuation of current sentencing practices; but, rather, was in-
cluded to assure the Commission would adequately examine current
sentencing practices so as to avoid "inadvertent" changes in those prac-
tices.93 Thus, the federal Commission, in proposing its sentencing recom-
mendations, need not apply the prison population constraint model of
Minnesota and the modified version of that model employed by New York.
While the Commission would be correct in so interpreting its legislative
mandate, it cannot afford to ignore totally the lessons of Minnesota and New
York. Federal prisons are already operating at excess capacity. If the Com-
mission's sentencing recommendations impose any additional strain on cor-
rectional facilities, the likely result will be the circumvention of the
guidelines by the courts. If the Commission is to avoid this result, it will
need to do more than merely consider the impact of the guidelines on prison
capacity. Some measure of coordination between sentencing recommenda-
tions and the capacity of correctional facilities is essential. For the Commis-
sion to act otherwise would be risky and irresponsible.
Some committee members urged that these mandatory minimum sentences be preserved under
the guidelines. See N.Y. DETERMINATE SENTENCING REP., supra note 25, at 63. These mem-
bers proposed that the punishment imposed should fit the crime and not the capacity of the
state's penal institutions. Id. at 69. In their view, New York's mandatory sentences had en-
sured certainty of punishment, which is not only critical to modem penological thinking, but
has also led to a significant reduction in serious crime. Id. at 75. Moreover, they suggested
that a reduction in mandatory minimums would constitute a step backward in the fight against
crime, undercut the recent efforts of the state legislature in enacting mandatory sentences, and
significantly diminish public confidence in the criminal justice system. Id.
90. See generally id. at 140-49 (setting out the Committee's rationale and methodology in
recommending sentences that would not exceed the state's currently planned prison capacity).
91. See id. at 146-47.
92. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
93. See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 1, at 61, 175.
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III. DURATION OF SENTENCES
Congress cautioned the Commission in formulating its original set of sen-
tencing guidelines that "in many cases, current sentences do not accurately
reflect the seriousness of the offense." 94 Congress accompanied this warning
with a directive that, "as a starting point," the Commission should deter-
mine the average sentence imposed in certain categories of criminal cases
and the lengths of sentences actually served in those cases.95 This mandate,
however, makes clear that the Commission need not be bound by its findings
of average sentences and may establish its own sentence ranges, provided
they are consistent with the sentencing purposes defined by the statute.
96
Congress' recommendation that the Commission assess sentencing prac-
tices prior to the construction of its guidelines model makes good sense. An
assessment of sentences actually imposed and the prison terms actually
served under these sentences is an essential step in the formulation of deter-
minate sentencing guidelines.97 The purpose of this exercise, however, need
not be a purely reflective one. This evaluation should provide the Commis-
sion with a barometer to gauge whether current sentencing practices would
be consistent with the defined sentencing purposes of punishment, deter-
rence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation embodied in the new statute.
98
The Commission's mandate does not end here. It will ultimately have to
determine the appropriate sanctions or sentence ranges to be imposed in a
given criminal situation. In making these determinations the experiences of
the New York and Minnesota sentencing commissions can provide some val-
uable guidance, as each applied a distinct approach in their guidelines
development.
94. 28 U.S.C.A. § 994(m) (West Supp. 1985). See also S. REP. No. 225, supra note I, at
61 (advising the Commission that current sentences for some violent offenders are too low and
that sentences for some property offenders are too high to serve the purposes of sentencing).
95. 28 U.S.C.A. § 994(m) (West Supp. 1985).
96. Id. For example, the Commission might conclude that first offenders convicted of
nonviolent offenses were too often being sentenced to a term of imprisonment when a sentence
to a term of probation in such cases might sufficiently carry out the necessary purposes of
punishment, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation, particularly if a fine, restitution, or
community service were imposed as a condition. On the other hand, the Commission might
determine that white collar criminals frequently received lenient sentences on the basis that
such offenders did not need to be rehabilitated. In these cases, the Commission might con-
clude that more severe sanctions should be imposed for purposes of deterrence and punish-
ment. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 1, at 177.
97. Forst, Rhodes & Wellford, Sentencing and Social Science: Research for the Formula-
tion of Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 355, 368 (1980).
98. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a)(2) (West 1985).
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A. The Descriptive Approach
The "descriptive approach"99 primarily views the construction of sentenc-
ing guidelines as a technical matter. " Generally speaking, it establishes a
statistical relationship between the sentence to be imposed with factors rep-
resenting the seriousness of the crime committed and the characteristics of
the offender."°I It also incorporates multiple sentencing purposes.10 2 Over-
all, it recommends that sentencing reform begin by being modeled after cur-
rent sentencing practices. 103
The New York Committee applied this approach in the development of its
guidelines by setting sentence ranges that were designed to maintain the level
of punishment produced under the current indeterminate system."° In pro-
posing sentences that reflect current practice, the actual time served by de-
fendants became the committee's "benchmark" for establishing sentence
ranges under the guidelines."0 5
The descriptive approach incorporates several attractive features: first, it
utilizes the expertise of sentencing judges in formulating guidelines that are
based on actual sentencing decisions; second, it minimizes disruptions in the
99. The descriptive approach to guidelines formulation was first proposed in 1978. The
methodology is so defined because it relies on the use of data that furnishes descriptive indica-
tors of the factors that underlie sentencing decisions and the weight accorded these several
factors. It is distinct from a prescriptive approach to guidelines development that relies not on
factors but on a philosophy or notion of what the correct sentence should be. L. WILKINS, J.
KRESS, D. GOTTFREDSON, J. CALPIN & A. GELMAN, SENTENCING GUIDELINES: STRUC-
TURING JUDICIAL DISCRETION XIV, 7-8 (Feb. 1978) (reporting on the feasibility study) [here-
inafter cited as L. WILKINS]. The descriptive approach to guidelines development has also
been generally referred to as the "Albany approach." MINN. IMPACT REP., supra note 24, at
8.
100. MINN. IMPACT REP., supra note 24, at 8. See also L. WILKINS, supra note 99, at 12-
19 (developing several sentencing models by calculating equations and sentencing patterns that
are reflective of current practices).
101. Forst, Rhodes & Wellford, supra note 97, at 372. See also L. WILKINS, supra note 99,
at XIV, 7-8 (providing a rationale for the selection of the appropriate offense and offender
characteristics to be considered).
102. See MINN. IMPACT REP., supra note 24, at 8. The Minnesota Commission, in consid-
ering whether to adopt the descriptive approach to guidelines development, assumed this ap-
proach would incorporate multiple sentencing purposes of punishment, deterrence,
incapacitation, and rehabilitation. Minnesota ultimately rejected this approach and chose a
guidelines model with one dominant sentencing goal that was retribution. See infra notes 118-
19 and accompanying text.
103. Forst, Rhodes & Wellford, supra note 97, at 371.
104. N.Y. DETERMINATE SENTENCING REP., supra note 25, at 58.
105. Id. Time actually served became the Committee's point of reference because terms
imposed at time of sentencing do not accurately reflect the period for which an offender is
incarcerated. Factors such as good time and parole decisions recommending early release
often result in the offender serving a shorter term than that imposed by the sentencing court.
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criminal justice system by constructing sentence ranges around established
sentencing norms; third, it bases sentencing guidelines on two well-estab-
lished sets of sentencing criteria-the characteristics of the offense commit-
ted and those of the offender; fourth, its straightforward presentation allows
individuals without statistical training to interpret the results; and finally, it
provides judges with a concise picture of their decisions and an opportunity
to examine, to evaluate, and to modify sentencing policy as they see fit. 106
Despite these attractive features, the descriptive approach has not been
immune from criticism. Some critics contend that it institutionalizes the bi-
ases and injustices associated with an indeterminate system, rather than
seeking to rectify these ills.' ° 7 Others argue that it is irrational to assume
that one sentencing norm can be derived from multiple sentencing goals
without at least evaluating the individual merits of these contending philoso-
phies."' 8 It has additionally been rebuked because it purportedly under-
emphasizes the need to fit the punishment to the seriousness of the crime.'0 9
While these theoretical bases for discrediting the descriptive approach
may have some validity, a more telling analysis of its value can be deter-
mined by examining the criticisms it provoked when applied in practice by
the New York Committee. A minority of members argued that the Commit-
tee's methodology was faulty in structuring narrow sentence ranges around
projections of time actually served, because the majority of state felony con-
victions resulted from guilty pleas that produced sentences of a lesser sever-
ity than those imposed when a defendant stands trial for the same offense. 1'
Some members also contended that the proposed sentence ranges severely
undercut the state's mandatory minimum sentences and that departures
from the guidelines by the judiciary would further exacerbate this reduction
106. Forst, Rhodes & Wellford, supra note 97, at 371-72.
107. MINN. IMPACT REP., supra note 24, at 8.
108. Id. at 9.
109. See Forst, Rhodes & Wellford, supra note 97, at 376. This criticism of the descriptive
approach has been primarily advanced by Andrew von Hirsch. Professor von Hirsch's major
criticism of this model is that it relies solely on quantifiable factors in determining punishment.
He argues that punishment should be imposed "because it is right" and that the severity of the
sanction should be directly proportionate to the seriousness of the crime or crimes committed.
Id. (quoting A. VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE 62-64 (1977)).
110. N.Y. DETERMINATE SENTENCING REP., supra note 25, at 73. These members as-
serted that an examination of the sentencing grid produced by the Committee revealed wide-
spread reduction of minimum sentences. Id. For example, defendants who commit certain
violent felony offenses but have no record of a prior felony conviction would be eligible for a
jail sentence of as little as one day, whereas the current mandatory minimum requires that they
serve a prison term of no less than 18 months for the offense. Id. These members additionally
asserted that repeat felony offenders would receive more lenient treatment under the Commit-
tee's proposal, which recommended a sentence reduction in the majority of these cases to a
level less than two-thirds of the present mandatory minimum. Id.
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in mandatory minimums.I" On the basis of these and other objections, the
Committee upgraded sentence ranges for certain categories of offenses." 2
Overall, however, the proposed guideline ranges reflected the Committee's
decision to model its guidelines after current sentencing practices and, in this
respect, the guidelines followed the descriptive approach.
B. The Prescriptive Approach
The "prescriptive approach" to guidelines development primarily focuses
on the philosophies and policy issues that underlie sentencing."' It does not
presume that current sentences should be a major influence in guidelines
formulation but, rather, that current sentencing practices should be consid-
ered on par with other available sentencing options." 4 The methodology
applied under the prescriptive approach is impact analysis; it examines the
consequence to the courts, corrections, and offenders in choosing one policy
option over another."'
After considerable deliberation as to the appropriate approach to follow in
its guidelines development, the Minnesota Commission settled on the pre-
scriptive approach." 6 In making this choice, the Commission reasoned that
the development of guidelines should be shaped principally by policy consid-
erations and rejected the view that guidelines formulation was a technical
problem resolvable by the application of a mathematical formula.' 17
Once the Commission decided that policy considerations and an analysis
of the impact of these considerations on the state's criminal justice system
should influence guidelines development, it turned its attention to the selec-
tion of the appropriate policy to apply. The Commission determined that
retribution, i.e., making the punishment imposed commensurate with the se-
111. Id. at 74. Some departure from the guideline recommendations is likely to occur. In
Minnesota, for example, where the departure standard is nearly identical to the standard pro-
posed in New York, judges departed from the presumptive guidelines sentences approximately
30% of the time. Id. Also, downward departures occurred more frequently than upward
departures. Id. If downward departures are taken into account, the sentencing grid proposed
by the Committee would lower mandatory sentences for literally every felony crime in New
York. Id. at 75.
112. Id. at 65.
113. MINN. IMPACT REP., supra note 24, at 9. See also supra note 99 and accompanying
text.
114. MINN. IMPACT REP., supra note 24, at 9.
115. Id.
116. Id. The Commission's decision to pursue the prescriptive approach followed from a
staff recommendation outlining a research strategy that emphasized the development of public
policy and the role of impact analysis in the Commission's work. Id.
117. Id. at 10.
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riousness of the crime, would be its dominant sentencing philosophy. I 8
Although the Commission's formula also incorporated sentencing goals of
deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation, it assigned secondary impor-
tance to these multiple sentencing objectives."1 9
Prior to the implementation of the Minnesota guidelines, some critics had
claimed that the structuring of determinate sentencing guidelines on the ba-
sis of a retributive philosophy would be unworkable.12 ° This criticism
pointed out the difficulty in equating crime seriousness with sentence sever-
ity or the limitation in quantifying a moral concept such as deservedness of
punishment. 
12 1
Notwithstanding these pessimistic predictions of the effects of a prescrip-
tive approach to guidelines development, a more accurate assessment of its
value can be determined by examining the results of its implementation in
Minnesota. Minnesota's emphasis on retribution, as its dominant sentencing
purpose, produced guideline recommendations under which more offenders
convicted of serious offenses against persons would be sent to prison with
fewer offenders of property crimes being imprisoned. 122 A three-year assess-
ment of the guidelines shows that despite an initial increase in the percentage
of offenders imprisoned for crimes against persons and an accompanying de-
crease in the imprisonment of property offenders, the commitment rates for
both categories of offenders have reverted to those rates in effect under the
118. Id. at 12. Sentencing purposes of rehabilitation, deterrence, and incapacitation were
also evaluated by the Commission in selecting a dominant sentencing goal. These purposes,
however, were considered to be inappropriate. The Commission rejected rehabilitation as a
dominant sentencing goal on the basis that it had been undermined as a primary sentencing
purpose by the Commission's legislative mandate. Deterrence was rejected on the ground that
there was limited understanding of the type of sentencing model that would best support this
objective. The Commission also decided that incapacitation should be excluded as a primary
sentencing purpose for both practical and ethical reasons. Id.
119. Id. at 12-14.
120. See generally Forst, Rhodes & Wellford, supra note 97, at 376-77 (pointing out the
practical limitations in applyitng a retributive logic, which is subjective and difficult to quantify,
to a determinate sentencing scheme). But cf von Hirsch & Hanrahan, supra note 87, at 292
(suggesting that a useful purpose in establishing sentencing standards is to make sentencing
more just and that justice demands the punishment be proportionate to the severity of the
criminal conduct).
121. Forst, Rhodes & Wellford, supra note 97, at 376-77. As the authors explain:
[T]he specific mechanics of how to link crime seriousness to sentence severity are
unclear. While crime seriousness scaling has evolved as a widely accepted practice,
the actual process of scaling sentence severity and translating crime and offender
seriousness into sentence severity is difficult to envision. Norval Morris sums up
these problems succinctly: "Desert is, of course, not precisely quantifiable."
Id. (footnotes omitted) (quoting N. MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 75 (1974)).
122. MINN. IMPACT REP., supra note 24, at 21.
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indeterminate sentencing system.'2 3 The Commission attributes this rever-
sion to a change in prosecutorial practices under the guidelines and to the
discretionary use of nonimprisonment sanctions by the courts. 24
These initial results in Minnesota suggest the prescriptive approach, as
predicted, has encountered difficulties. Adaptive responses to the guidelines
by prosecutors and the courts have frustrated the achievement of the Com-
mission's goal to make sentences reflective of the seriousness of the offense
committed. Moreover, the Commission is now left with the difficult choice
of either modifying its underlying policy considerations or restricting those
practices that it claims have impeded the desired goal of making sentences
primarily retributive.'
25
The descriptive approach, by comparison, may be faulted for preserving
the status quo in current sentencing practices and for failing to equate pun-
ishment with the seriousness of the crime. It does, however, provide greater
flexibility in guideline development by allowing for the consideration of mul-
tiple goals in sentencing.126 It also allows for the future adjustment of the
sentencing ranges initially recommended, if these are found to be inconsis-
tent with sentencing objectives. This adjustment would be far easier to im-
plement than a shift in policy. The descriptive approach will not be immune
from criticism, particularly from those who believe current sentencing prac-
tices are not harsh enough.127 These objections alone, however, do not pro-
vide a sufficient rationale to defeat federal guideline recommendations that,
at least at the outset, would follow the descriptive approach.
IV. REGULATING PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION
A frequent criticism of determinate sentencing is that presumptive guide-
lines will shift sentencing discretion from judges to prosecutors. 2 8 The the-
ory is based on a presumption that sentencing dispositions will be controlled
by prosecutors through charging and plea negotiating practices and thereby
undermine the sentencing guidelines. 129 Congress sought to obviate this
concern by directing the Commission to issue policy statements to guide sen-
tencing courts in determining the acceptability of a plea bargaining agree-
123. See id. at 31.
124. See Knapp, supra note 73, at 189.
125. Id. ("Adaptive responses by implementing participants are to be expected. Policy-
makers are left with the choice of using their authority to reassert policy goals or to modify
policy goals, either actively by articulating new goals or passively by allowing de facto goals to
emerge by default.").
126. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
127. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
128. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 1, at 63.
129. Id.
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ment.' 30 By examining proposed plea agreements, judges could more ably
guard against the use of plea bargaining to circumvent the guidelines.''
The presumption that determinate sentencing will automatically create a
shift in sentencing discretion, however, is not a universally held belief.'3 2
One contention is that, in the absence of any concrete evidence as to how
prosecutorial decisions will effect determinate sentencing systems, the pre-
sumed imbalance in discretion remains an empirical question. 3 This the-
ory further suggests that while guidelines will increase a prosecutor's
influence in disposition, that alone will not undermine the guidelines, unless
prosecutors elect to exercise their powers in a manner inconsistent with the
underlying purposes of determinate sentencing.
13 4
It has also been suggested that the real concern with plea bargaining
should not be whether it shifts sentencing discretion to the prosecutor, but,
rather, whether it should be tolerated at all in a determinate sentencing sys-
tem. 135 The argument under this philosophy is that if the entry of a plea
negotiation is not viewed as a mitigating factor, then the validity of the entire
practice of plea bargaining is brought into question under a determinate sen-
tencing system where the underlying purpose is to treat similar defendants
alike on the basis of their criminal conduct.'
36
Both the Minnesota and New York guidelines commissions have been
cautious in affecting any changes to their current plea bargaining practices.
Minnesota opted against limiting prosecutorial power until it had an oppor-
tunity to study the reaction of prosecutors under the guidelines.'1 7  The
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See generally von Hirsch & Hanrahan, supra note 87, at 312-15 (defining the problem
with prosecutorial discretion in a determinate sentencing system).
133. Id. at 313. Although some studies are currently underway to examine the impact of
presumptive sentencing guidelines, their results are yet unknown. Id. Until the states have
had an opportunity to examine this problem and report their findings, any claims that an
attempt to regulate sentencing decisions at one stage of the process will automatically shift
discretion to another point in the process are speculative. Id.
134. Id.
135. See Frankel & Orland, supra note 13, at 235.
136. Id. If the objective of a determinate sentencing system is consistency in sentencing,
then plea bargaining practices that tend to promote inconsistency in the treatment of offenders
become less acceptable or may not even be acceptable at all. As the authors further point out:
With a sentencing commission and guidelines in place, we may have to reckon with
the pressure to be consistent. If a guilty plea is not considered a mitigating factor in
sentencing, the fundamental premise of plea bargaining becomes suspect and proba-
bly unacceptable. If the fundamental objective is to treat like defendants alike, the
failure of prosecutors to do so becomes more painfully subversive than it has tended
to seem until now.
Id.
137. See MINN. IMPACT REP., supra note 24, at 71-86. Although the Minnesota Commis-
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Minnesota Commission has carefully monitored statewide prosecutorial
practices since the implementation of its guidelines and continues to do
so. 13' The Commission reports significant intra-county and inter-county
variations in charging and negotiating practices.139 The Commission, how-
ever, admits that its analysis of prosecutorial practices "is in its infant
stage. '" 14° It recommends further observation of prosecutorial practices over
a more extensive period in order to isolate the effects of changes within a
county from the effects of changes produced by the guidelines. 141 An inves-
tigation of the feasibility of developing plea negotiation guidelines is pres-
ently being conducted by the state legislature. 142
New York, like Minnesota, chose to monitor closely the operation of its
guidelines and to examine their impact on the balance of sentencing discre-
tion between prosecutors and judges. 143 The Committee found no evidence
that a determinate sentencing structure would result in a significant increase
in prosecutorial power. 1" Moreover, it concluded it could not accurately
predict how prosecutors would respond to the new guidelines or adjust their
plea bargain practices once the determinate sentencing model was
implemented. 145
sion decided against imposing any constraints on prosecutorial practices, it was not unmindful
of the interplay with plea bargaining techniques in a presumptive sentencing system. The
Commission acknowledged in its report that prosecutorial power "unquestionably increased
with the implementation of the Sentencing Guidelines." Id. at 71. The report points out that
increasing a charge to a higher severity level would not necessarily result in a higher sentence,
since the upper boundaries of sentences would be subject to evidentiary constraints. Id. How-
ever, prosecutors could mitigate sentences by reducing a charge to a lower severity level, as the
lower presumptive sentence is unlimited. Id. Prosecutors could also affect sentence duration
in cases of multiple offenses. Id. If a serious person offense is involved, a charging decision
could result in a longer sentence through the imposition of a sentence to a consecutive term.
Id.
138. See id. at 71-86.
139. Id. at 71.
140. Id. The Minnesota Commission also points out that its study of plea bargaining prac-
tices under the guidelines is "more descriptive than evaluative." The Report further states:
Empirical analysis of prosecutorial practices is in its infant stage and it will undoubt-
edly take a number of studies to reach the level of analysis that has been achieved
regarding judicial sentencing practices. . . Until empirical analysis can be con-
ducted over a more extensive period it will be difficult to isolate the effects of changes
within a county and the effects of policy changes outside the county such as the
Sentencing Guidelines. This discussion constitutes a beginning toward an eventual,
more thorough evaluation of prosecutorial practices.
Id.
141. Id. See supra note 137.
142. See MINN. IMPACT REP., supra note 24, at 86.
143. N.Y. DETERMINATE SENTENCING REP., supra note 25, at 101-02.
144. Id. at 101.
145. Id.
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The federal Sentencing Commission, in comparison to the commissions in
Minnesota and New York, has received an express mandate from Congress
to provide judges with some guidance in overseeing prosecutorial practices
under the guidelines. 146 While this directive is viewed as a necessary precau-
tion against the nullification of the guidelines by plea bargaining practices, it
is not clear that such a danger exists. At present, there is no evidence that
the guidelines will be undermined by prosecutors, nor is there any proof that
judicial discretion will be automatically displaced. Until the federal Com-
mission has had an opportunity to examine and to evaluate the impact of
plea negotiations under the guidelines, it should move cautiously in this area.
Its recommendations to sentencing judges on evaluating plea agreements
should ultimately rely on the facts and not on the arguments of what is likely
to occur.
V. CONCURRENT VERSUS CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES
One important factor influencing the length of prison terms and their im-
pact on federal prison capacity under the new guidelines will be whether
judges elect to sentence defendants convicted of multiple offenses to concur-
rent or consecutive terms. In the absence of any statutory guidance, under
current law, on the appropriateness of concurrent or consecutive terms,
judges have been accorded broad discretion in sentencing offenders con-
victed of multiple offenses.' 47 The new sentencing provisions will not re-
move this discretion entirely but, instead, seek to codify existing practices
with one important caveat. 148 In deciding whether a sentence should run
concurrently or consecutively, sentencing courts must consider the nature of
the offense committed and the criminal history of the offender in conjunction
with the statute's defined sentencing purposes, the sentencing guidelines, and
any applicable policy statements of the sentencing commission.'
49
The new sentencing law, with one limited exception, 5 ' provides that
sentences to multiple terms of imprisonment may be ordered to run concur-
rently or consecutively whether imposed at the same time or while the de-
fendant is serving another term. "' If the sentencing court is silent as towhether to impose a concurrent or consecutive term, the statute makes pre-
146. See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 1, at 63.
147. Id. Existing law permits the imposition of either concurrent or consecutive sentences,
but provides the courts with no statutory guidance in making the choice. Id.
148. See id. at 126-28.
149. Id. at 128.
150. The exception applies to criminal attempt. Consecutive terms of imprisonment may
not be imposed for attempt or for an offense that was the sole objective of the attempt. 18
U.S.C.A. § 3584(a) (West 1985). See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 1, at 126.
151. S. REP. No. 225, supra note i, at 126.
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sumptions as to which term would be appropriate. Unless a statute requires
otherwise, sentences for multiple offenses imposed at the same time are pre-
sumed to run concurrently, whereas sentences imposed at different times are
presumed to run consecutively.' 52 The role of the Sentencing Commission
with respect to concurrent or consecutive sentences will be to insure that the
proposed guidelines reflect the appropriateness of imposing an incremental
penalty in cases where the defendant is convicted of multiple offenses arising
out of a single criminal transaction or multiple offenses committed at differ-
ent times. 
1 53
In determining the appropriateness of imposing incremental penalties,
Congress suggested three possible scenarios illustrative of sentencing out-
comes in multiple offense cases for consideration by the Commission. '5 4 If a
defendant was convicted of multiple commissions of the same offense, the
guidelines may recommend a sanction slightly in excess of the proposed
guideline sentence for a single commission of the offense.155 If, however,
sentencing was for two separate offenses committed at different times, the
Commission may recommend that the sentencing court order the sentence to
run consecutively.' 56 On the other hand, if the conviction is for one offense
that was committed in the course of the commission of another unrelated
offense, the guidelines may advise either an incremental penalty over the
proposed sanction for one offense or the aggregation of the recommended
sentences for each offense.' 57
These proposals, however, are purely advisory and do not serve as an ex-
plicit directive to the Commission. The Commission is granted considerable
leeway under its legislative mandate in providing guidance to the sentencing
courts in determining the appropriateness of imposing concurrent or consec-
utive terms.' 58 Indeed, the Commission is precluded from issuing any policy
recommendations in a total vacuum. 159 Consideration must be given to
152. Id. at 127.
153. Id. at 176-77. The Senate Report particularly notes the need for the Commission to
consider the appropriateness of imposing an incremental penalty for an offense committed
while a defendant is on release. Id. at 176. If no incremental penalty is provided, there would
be no deterrent to the commission of a subsequent offense during the interval before the of-
fender is called to account for the first offense. Id. at 176-77.
154. See id. at 127-28.
155. Id. at 127.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 127-28.
158. 28 U.S.C.A. § 994(1) (West Supp. 1985). The statute provides that the Commission
shall insure that the guidelines reflect the appropriateness of imposing an incremental penalty
for each offense in which a defendant is convicted of multiple offenses committed in the same
course of conduct or multiple offenses committed at different times.
159. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3584(b) (West 1985). This section sets out the major purposes to be
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whether guideline recommendations will reduce sentencing disparity-a goal
the statute is committed to achieve."6° Also, and probably more impor-
tantly, the Commission will need to assess the likely impact of its recommen-
dations on concurrent and consecutive sentences on the current federal
prison population.161 An examination of the New York and Minnesota sen-
tencing commissions' treatment of the concurrent versus consecutive sen-
tencing issue could prove useful to the federal Commission in weighing these
important concerns.
The Minnesota Sentencing Commission recommended that in cases of
multiple offenses, concurrent sentences would be the norm; the most severe
sentence for which a conviction was obtained would dictate the appropriate
sentence range to be imposed under the guidelines. 162 Sentences to consecu-
tive terms would be permissible, but not required, under a few, limited cir-
cumstances. 163 Any sentence to a consecutive term that failed to meet the
guidelines' criteria in the limited case exceptions would constitute a depar-
ture from the guidelines and require a written explanation by the sentencing
judge."64
In recommending that the guidelines create a presumption in favor of con-
current sentences, the Minnesota Commission reasoned that consecutive
sentences constitute a more severe sanction because their intent is to incar-
cerate an offender for a longer period. 165 Consequently, the Commission
concluded that the imposition of consecutive sentences should be limited to
more severe offenses, if the severity of the sentences is to be proportional to
the seriousness of the offense. 1
66
A guidelines recommendation on the use of concurrent and consecutive
sentences was never formulated by the New York Guidelines Committee
because committee members were unable to reach a consensus on whether
considered by the Commission and the courts in determining the particular sentence to be
imposed.
160. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a)(6) (West 1985). Among those factors to be considered in im-
posing a sentence is "the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants
with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct." Id.
161. 28 U.S.C.A. § 994(g) (West Supp. 1985).
162. MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND COMMISSION, MINNESOTA SENTENC-
ING GUIDELINES AND COMMENTARY 22 (Aug. 1, 1984) (on file at the Catholic University
Law Review).
163. Id. Consecutive sentences may be imposed in cases of multiple felony conviction that
involve a crime against a person or crimes against different persons or when the conviction is
for escape from lawful custody. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 23.
166. Id.
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existing law provides adequate guidance and clarity in this area. 167 The
Committee acknowledged, however, that guidance should be provided to the
sentencing courts, beyond that furnished by statute and case law, in cases
where multiple offenses are committed in the course of a single criminal
transaction. 68 The Committee also noted that, in the absence of a uniform
statewide rule governing the imposition of concurrent and consecutive
sentences, the guidelines would not be effective in avoiding disparate sen-
tencing practices. 169 Although the Committee initially left this issue un-
resolved, the matter has been referred for further study.
170
In addressing the issue of concurrent and consecutive sentences, the fed-
eral Commission hopefully will avoid a protracted debate on the adequacy of
statutory and case law, as the New York Committee did. Indeed, the Com-
mission's legislative mandate implies it should look beyond statutory provi-
sions and play a decisive role in providing specific guidelines to the
sentencing judges on this issue. 17 1 If disparity in sentencing is to be avoided,
a uniform policy on concurrent and consecutive sentencing terms should be-
come a reality and not a postponed goal.
Assuming the Commission perceives this to be its initial responsibility,
then its focus will be whether the guidelines should presume sentences to
concurrent terms, sentences to consecutive terms, or some combination of
both. The Minnesota Commission offered a sound rationale for a presump-
tion favoring concurrent sentences in concluding that the severity of the
sanction should be tied closely to the seriousness of the offense committed.
Two additional rationales would support this conclusion. First, a presump-
tion toward consecutive sentences, or harsher penalties, would tend to favor
the retributive purposes of sentencing over the other defined sentencing pur-
poses of incapacitation, deterrence, and rehabilitation. Second, if consecu-
tive sentences become the norm, rather than the exception, this choice would
likely trigger an increase in the already overextended capacity of federal pris-
ons. The federal Commission may, as Minnesota did, want to specify some
situations that would warrant the more severe sanction of consecutive
sentences. A presumption favoring concurrent sentences, however, would be
the most prudent and rational choice.
VI. CONCLUSION
The development and implementation of a new federal sentencing policy




171. See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 1, at 63.
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that is intended to provide greater uniformity, fairness, and certainty in fed-
eral sentencing practices will be a formidable undertaking. While Congress
has provided the federal Sentencing Commission with the necessary frame-
work to accomplish this goal, the Commission's task will be to construct
from this foundation a cohesive sentencing guidelines policy that will be
workable, balanced, and fair. Although the determinate sentencing models
produced by Minnesota and New York will provide some guidance to the
federal Commission, the experience of these sentencing commissions sug-
gests that there will be no readily available formula for the federal Commis-
sion to apply in the development of its sentencing guidelines system.
Delicate balances must be struck between the need to ensure that convicted
offenders receive certain punishment without overburdening the capacity of
the federal prison system. A decision must be made as to the appropriate-
ness of adopting a descriptive or prescriptive approach in determining the
actual sentences to be imposed under the guidelines. Consideration must
also be given to whether broader discretion will be automatically conferred
on federal prosecutors in plea bargaining as a consequence of narrowing ju-
dicial discretion in sentencing decisions. In addition, a determination must
be made as to the appropriateness of imposing sentences to either concurrent
or consecutive terms of imprisonment for the commission of multiple of-
fenses. There will be no easy solutions to these issues, and the federal Sen-
tencing Commission, like the commissions in Minnesota and New York, will
be confronted with some difficult choices. In addressing these concerns
anew, the challenge to the federal Commission will be to build on the exper-
iences of Minnesota and New York and develop a federal sentencing policy
that will serve as a model of determinate sentencing reform.
Janet Alberghini
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